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7 Gender, conflict, and social
capital
Bonding and bridging in war in the
former Yugoslavia
Maja Korac
The 1990s are marked by unprecedented mobilisation for armed conflict at the
local or state level. With 44 countries, or 25 per cent of the world’s states at war
during this period, the world experienced more violent conflict than ever before.
Conflicts of the 1990s are often called new wars (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001)
as they are importantly shaped by the processes of globalisation, structural
changes in the world economy and politics, that is, by the emergence of the
“new world order.” This type of war is characterised not only by the new,
unconventional forms of warfare, but also by the changed form and nature of
mobilisation for both forging war and promoting peace. The nature and forms of
mobilisation in this type of conflict range from local or national to transnational
or international.
Duffield (2001) defines new wars as network wars referring to the links and
connections formed within states as well as at local-global levels, which are
central to mobilising people/fighters as well as securing arms and other
resources for this type of war. The centrality of networks to this type of war,
however, goes beyond mobilising and resource factors. They are critical for how
this type of conflict spreads and takes root in society causing widespread victim-
isation of populations for prolonged periods. Conflicts of the 1990s have been
internal and overwhelmingly marked by the divisive politics that have trans-
formed ethnicity into an effective weapon of war. Reshaping social networks
and links at the communal level is central to constructing these wars as “ethnic”
or “religious.” Duffield (1997) and Kaldor (1999) point out that one of the
highest and the gravest costs of new wars is the destruction of social networks
and local communities caused by the divisive identity politics of this type of
war. By spreading fear and hatred among populations at a communal level,
political elites and local warlords mobilise them for support of, and engagement
in, violent conflict, and effectively use ethnicity as a tool of war. Goodhand and
Hulme (1999: 17–18) point out that “[i]n contemporary conflicts, ‘the commun-
ity’ represents the nexus of conflict action.” It is at the communal level, they
emphasise, where most of the physical violence and suffering occurs (ibid.).
The destruction of social networks at the communal level is about undermin-
ing trust and webs of support embedded in (local) social connections
tied through local institutions as well as other, informal ties such as family,
friendship links, and other forms of sociability and communal links. As these
types of bonding and bridging social links are important sources of individual and
group identities, as well as social stability and cohesion, their destruction is crit-
ical for implementing and spreading divisive politics of new wars and for mobil-
ising support for them. Through various social and political mechanisms, the trust
which these connections engender is gradually replaced by fear of a neighbour,
friend, fellow co-worker or colleague, and often a relative or a family member,
all of whom become labelled as the “Other” within the divisive, exclusionary dis-
course of new war. This type of discourse prescribes and imposes legitimacy of
one type of bond, most often ethnic understood as primordial, and requires
destruction, to the point of annihilation, of any bridging connections between
diverse individuals and groups at the communal, local level, and beyond.
If undermining trust and webs of social support is central to the development
and spreading of new wars, regaining, recreating, and developing new basis of
trust is critical for building “viable constituencies for peace” (Goodhand and
Hulme 1999: 18), hence, for conflict resolution and any lasting, sustainable
peace. Such “islands of civility” (Kaldor 1999) consisting of individuals and
groups promoting inter-group, cross-ethnic bridging connections and civic,
rather than ethnic politics, exist or have the potential to emerge in the context of
new war. It is critical, therefore, to acknowledge and support their existence or
to identify social and political forces and spaces within which they have the
potential to emerge, as well as to develop strategies to promote them. The char-
acter of connections underpinning this type of mobilisation in a new war are
importantly about recreating old or developing new basis of trust between
groups constructed by political elites and warlords as ethnic and opposing. In
this sense, these inter-group links are primarily bridging in nature aimed at
establishing bonds across difference and (ethnic) boundaries, rather than embed-
ded in them. Much of these processes concern identity as well as politics, and
are about the politics of identity rather than identity politics. This latter distinc-
tion is important as it points to the bottom-up processes through which local
people challenge, subvert, and contest structures of power that constrain their
social lives (Hill and Wilson 2003: 2). This process is in opposition to the top-
down processes of identity politics whereby various political, social, and eco-
nomic entities and elites attempt to mould collective identities into fixed and
“naturalised” frames (ibid.).
The emphasis on social networks and trust as the entry point into the analysis
of the new type of war, links social capital to the mechanisms and processes
underpinning the ways in which they unfold, develop, and are made to last for
prolonged periods of time or are undermined from within. The recognition of
this link provides a useful conceptual framework for exploring how social net-
works and trust are reshaped in this type of conflict. It facilitates understanding
of their role in spreading new war as well as in forging peace. Social capital is
thus understood here as social-relational concept, encompassing norms of
reciprocity and trust (Coleman 1990). To reveal and understand how social
capital translates into social and political engagement for war or peace it is
108 M. Korac
important to identify conditions shaping norms of reciprocity and facilitating the
development of different forms of trust in specific contexts.
In the remainder of this chapter, I develop further some of these points con-
ceptually as well as empirically in reference to my research on the violent
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. By looking (back) at the processes
that led to the formation of ethnicised states in the region, I explore the role of
social capital, its bonding and bridging qualities, in setting the stage for spread-
ing ethnic hatred and fuelling violence in this conflict, as well as in opening up
spaces for reconciliation and conflict resolution. In doing this, I am particularly
interested in examining the gender dimensions of these processes.
From cross-ethnic bridges to ethnic bonds: gender and the
process of naturalising trust and reciprocity
Ethnicity, understood as a set of fixed and naturalised (ethnic) ties and bonds
defined by “common blood and origin” had been at the centre of attention during
the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. Conflict was most often described as
ethnic war attributed to “the centuries of animosity” among the peoples of the
Balkans and inequality marked by ethnicity. A more careful and informed analy-
sis of the situation in the country demonstrates, however, that in ethnic terms
Yugoslavia was, as Woodward (1995: 32) noted, a land of minorities, in which
most local communities and large parts of the country were ethnically mixed,
and no group had more than a regional majority. These ethnically mixed local
communities were sites not just of peaceful multicultural co-existence, as known
in the West, but of genuine cohesion exemplified in the high percentage of
ethnically mixed marriages and people of ethnically mixed backgrounds (Kaldor
1999; Korac 2004; Morokvasic-Müller 2004).1 Moreover, the primary social
divisions and inequalities of the pre-war Yugoslavia “were not defined by ethni-
city but by job status and growing unemployment” (Woodward 1995: 44). Thus,
the social fabric of life at the communal level was importantly cross-ethnic, as
were the socio-economic divisions and inequalities. How had these bridging
social relations that allowed for the formation of specific forms of reciprocity
and cross-ethnic trust been reshaped into bitter ethnic divisions and seemingly
impermeable boundaries? What type of trust and reciprocity is shaped by this
kind of boundary formation? How are these processes gendered?
In answering these questions it is necessary to examine, albeit briefly, the
intersection of socio-economic and political factors and conditions of the 1980s,
and explore how these led to the development of divisive identity politics and to
the centrality of ethnic rather than civic politics in the region. A socio-economic
crisis in Yugoslavia emerged in the 1980s and was linked to the reprogramming
of the country’s foreign debt. The latter was dictated by the IMF and the World
Bank which, following the world oil crisis of the mid 1970s, put pressure on the
then Yugoslav government to introduce austerity measures and restructure the
economy. The effects of these measures and the crisis that followed were visible
and demoralising as millions of people were experiencing a substantial decrease
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in their standard of living and an equally high percentage had lost their jobs.
Structural limitations of the Yugoslav economy, which had relatively limited
elements of market economy, as well as the country’s inadequate political
decision-making structures, in conjunction with the structural changes in the
world economy and politics, led the society to a deep crisis. The resulting eco-
nomic, social, and political restructuring caused a gradual dismantling of state
socialism.
These processes triggered the onset of a personal and collective identity crisis
for the population in the region. They also heightened people’s sense of eco-
nomic and social insecurity, because they were no longer protected by the shield
of the socialist state. Ethnicity and ethnic (be)longing articulated and tied
through nationalist claims for ethnic purity of their territories had a powerful
appeal, as it promised millions of people a sense of belonging and security at the
time of radical change. The post-socialist nationalists skilfully manipulated this
sense of disorientation among the population. By seeking political power over
sub-federal territories,2 they aggressively sought to create a base for an ethnic
identity that would support their projects of ethnically exclusive states. Given
the cross-ethnic character of social relations and ties in the country as well as the
actual ethnic mix of population territorially and geographically, the nationalists’
aim for “ethnically pure” states required a radical shift in discourse. History and
language were to be purged of any notion of peaceful co-existence, as cultural
“cleansing” was a precursor to war. In the process, cross-ethnic links, coopera-
tion, and historic ties were replaced by the essential notion of ethnic difference.
Ethnic groups, the post-socialist nationalists claimed, were tied with a “common
blood” and “common destiny” which form the natural basis for cooperation,
reciprocity, and trust. Any other types of bonds were perceived as a threat to the
historic, cultural, and territorial claims of the ethnic collective. Within the polit-
ical nationalistic discourse and, consequently, the public realm, cross-ethnic
links were treated as suspicious or more often as a dangerous aberration away
from the natural and normal ethnic ties and bonds based on shared tradition, reli-
gion, and culture.
Despite the political claims made by politicians, multi-ethnic Yugoslavia was
still a reality in the lives of its individual citizens in 1990–1. A survey of 650
refugees in Serbia, originating from 52 ethnically heterogeneous communities in
Croatia, showed that the disintegration of their communities was not the result
of ethnic tensions in their day-to-day lives in the experience of those surveyed
(Milivojevic 1992). Rather, it resulted from political pressure orchestrated by the
political elites and their nationalistic parties causing fear among the local cit-
izens. This type of pressure gradually led to ethnic tensions, conflict, and their
flight to Serbia (ibid.).
In this survey two-thirds of the respondents came from minority groups in
their communities. Some 86 per cent of them had ethnic origins that differed
from those of their neighbours, while 96 per cent had established friendships and
66 per cent had family relations with members of other ethnic groups. Fully 60
per cent denied the existence of ethnic divisions or intolerance in their
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communities and 77 per cent had not had personal conflicts with members of
other ethnic groups. While 5.5 per cent judged the atmosphere to be one of
ethnic division and intolerance, only 1.2 per cent were able to give evidence of
personal conflicts with members of other ethnic groups, and a mere 0.8 per cent
were able to give evidence of collective forms of such conflict (Milivojevic
1992). These data describe the situation in ethnically mixed communities in
Croatia before the first multi-party election campaigns in the region, in the
winter of 1990. According to the same survey, from that time on, the situation
started to change, and relations with neighbours, friends, and even relations
among family members deteriorated.
My own research revealed a similar pattern.3 For example, Goca, a Bosnian
Serb woman from eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, a teacher, portrayed the situation
in her town a few years before her flight:
In our street, the neighbours were mostly Muslims [. . .] Those seven, eight
Muslim homes around us, we didn’t celebrate any holiday [religious] alone,
our neighbours, all of them would come, wish us a happy holiday, but also,
not a Bairam [Muslim religious holiday] passed without us wishing them a
happy holiday [. . .] Believe me that we, from [her hometown], neither
Muslims nor Serbs, didn’t want war [. . .] We couldn’t conceive there’d be a
war, that I’d run away from my Muslim neighbour. And I also know that my
closest Muslim neighbours didn’t think so [. . .] Actually, two years before the
war [the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started in April 1992], something
changed in the people, you’d talk with your friends, but there were some
things you’d not talk about [. . .] You could feel it in the school [where she
worked as a teacher], that parents were choosing a Muslim, a Serb teacher.
That grieved me very much [. . .] In the circle of people with whom me and my
husband were friends [. . .] the people started wondering the last two years
what was happening, when those national parties won in our Bosnia [in 1990].
(personal communication, summer 1995)
Similarly, Branka, a Croatian Serb woman from eastern Croatia, explained the
situation in her hometown before flight:
You couldn’t feel it [ethnic intolerance] at all, nor did anyone ask you what
you were [in terms of one’s ethnic origin]. I don’t know [. . .] I didn’t feel
that we [Serbs in her hometown mostly populated by Croats] were being
treated differently, we’re this and you’re that. Not until Tudjman’s [the then
President of Croatia] Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ party] started, those
elections, then they went completely crazy. Maybe you wouldn’t have paid
so much attention to it, but there is this fear, the fear your parents passed on
to you ’cause they have gone through some things [during the IIWW].4
Like, here it is [nationalism] rearing its head again. Then the media, since
we could only watch Channel 1 of the Belgrade and Zagreb state TV.
(personal communication, summer 1995)
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Politicians engineered war propaganda, targeting the voters who, in 1990, at the
time of the first multi-party elections in the country, were still ambivalent and
did not make a clear choice for nationalists and independence (Woodward 1995:
118). The process was not smooth, as it took time and a lot of war propaganda to
recreate “national enemies” and to develop paranoia within ethnic collectives.
As in other conflicts constructed as ethnic strife, for example in Rwanda, the
role of the media was central to spreading fear and hatred among populations at
the communal level.5 As Parin (1994: 41) pointed out, television and radio were
tightly controlled and were “serving the populace a diet of lies, invention, and
propaganda, sometimes horrifying, sometimes sentimental.” The “television
war” and the media war started long before the outbreak of the armed conflict.6
In his analysis, Parin (ibid.) refers to a statement of Marco Altherr, the then
Head of the International Red Cross delegation in the former Yugoslavia, in
which he asserts that television was in large measure responsible for atrocities
on both sides of the conflict in Croatia, “by having aroused instincts of revenge
and unleashed reciprocal acts of retribution.”
In their rhetoric, the post-socialist nationalists claimed that the “unnatural”
socialist regime had replaced religion, tradition, shared blood, and kin for the
emancipation of the working class, women, and proletarian internationalism.
The nationalistic discourse, for its part, offered a set of values constructed as
traditional, which could easily be perceived as natural. According to these
“new” values women were expected to take on the responsibilities for the
(re)production of the group, as well as custody of cultural values and identity.
Policies were introduced encouraging the population growth of the “right kind”
in the name of “national security” (Korac 1996). Many authors have emphasised
that women are central to producing and maintaining cultural and group identity
(e.g. Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997; Walby 1992). During
the growing process of militarisation associated with the escalation of armed
conflict, women often become specifically targeted because of these roles. This
is because identity politics of new wars constructed as ethnic strife assign
women with “honourable” roles as “Mothers of the Nation” and “Symbols of the
Nation.”7 They became increasingly seen as precious property to be controlled
and “protected.”
In this type of conflict, women are seen as precious property of both the
“enemy” and the nationalists. Their bodies become territories to be seized and
conquered. Testimonies of the raped women in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
show that conquering women’s bodies did not primarily mean sexual violence
against them, but a pattern of revenge and aggression resulting in the physical
victimisation of women (Stiglmayer 1994: 118). Physical and sexual violence
against women in war (and in peace) serves as a “method” of “disciplining”
women who fail to behave “properly.” Women are “disciplined” by men of the
opposed ethnic group because they are loyal to their husbands and community.8
Rape in war constructed as ethnic strife is also a powerful symbolic weapon
against the “enemy.” The woman, as a symbol of the nation, as pointed
out earlier, depicts the “Motherland” as a spatial metaphor, an embodied
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femaleness. Rape of the woman’s body/nation, by planting alien seed, disrupts
the maintenance of the collective. This logic leads to interpretations of rape as
ethnic harm, rather than a violent assault on women’s rights to reproductive self-
determination, through the violation of women’s bodies and control of their
lives. Rape is also an effective weapon of territorial “cleansing,” since men in
patriarchal cultures will not return to the communities where they have been
“humiliated” by the rape of “their” women (Korac 1999). The very logic of rape
as a weapon in the brutal strategy of “ethnic-cleansing,” as Meznaric (1994: 79)
explains, rests upon “the use of gender as a means to control communication and
to sharpen the boundaries between two opposed ethnicities.”
The rape of women “belonging to the enemy” carries an important symbolic
message from men to men. As Seifert (1994: 58) points out, it communicates to
men of the opposing group that they are unable to defend their women. Therefore,
she argues, sexual aggression towards women in war results, at a symbolic level,
in wounded masculinity, marking men as “incompetent” in their role as protectors
of their women (Seifert 1994: 58). Rape and sexual violence in war also functions
as an important mobilising element for furthering militarisation of ethnic collec-
tives. In war masculinity is predominantly equated with militarised aggression.
Consequently, men are under constant pressure to prove their manhood by joining
the military and by committing various acts of violence, importantly including
sexual violence. Militarised violence, therefore, becomes the process within which
men can ultimately prove their “wounded” masculinity.
Reshaping social relations marked by cross-ethnic ties and the creation of
ethnic tensions, hatred and (militarised) violence was, therefore, a profoundly
gendered process. Due to the patriarchal backlash of the transition period briefly
outlined here, the notions of femininity and masculinity had been gradually
reshaped and closely linked to the notions of ethnic purity, identity, and authen-
ticity. This change and the resulting shift in the dynamics of gender relations of
power were central to instigating (militarised) war violence. Women and men
had gradually become mobilised and engaged with war through their reshaped
gender roles. Their fe/male bodies, feminine and masculine, had been critical
both symbolically and physically for naturalising ethnic bonds and the creation
of new ethnicised forms of statehood.
In this sense, both women and men as specifically located and positioned
gendered actors played active, albeit different, roles in this war. They also
responded to the conflict in different ways. While some became actively
involved in waging or supporting war, others sought alliances across conflict
imposed divisions and demarcation lines organising themselves against war. The
last section of this chapter examines both the conceptual and context specific
reasons why (some) women opted for alternative political mobilisation during
the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, and became involved in anti-war initi-
atives as women. Their activism, I argue, had an important potential in conflict
resolution although it was never fully acknowledged and adequately supported.
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Recreating cross-ethnic trust: bottom-up identity work of
anti-war women’s groups
During the 1990s, there was a number of women’s groups in Serbia (e.g.
Women in Black Belgrade,9 and Autonomous Women’s Centre Belgrade),
Croatia (e.g. Centre for Women War Victims Zagreb), and in Bosnia (e.g.
Medica Zenica, and Women for Women, Sarajevo), which can be regarded as
some of the very few “islands of civility” (Kaldor 1999). The work of these
groups was aimed at re-establishing cross-ethnic ties and forms of trust, as these
women recognised quite early on the centrality of maintaining old and develop-
ing new connections across ethnic lines and boundaries of the new ethnicised
states.
The awareness of the centrality of inter-group connections across the ethnic
divide for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction prompted these
anti-war women’s groups to embark upon work with refugee women and
women survivors of sexual violence in war. As these women have been the
most violently affected by the exclusionary ethnic politics and nationalism in
the region they were in the greatest need of support to overcome their experi-
ences of victimisation as an ethnic “other.” They were also those who, as it
was then hoped, would eventually return to their homes and thus actively
engage in re-building their multi-ethnic communities. The work with women
who were subjected to sexual violence was particularly important because of
the social and political implications of sexualised forms of violence in this
type of conflict, as outlined earlier. Anti-war women’s groups argued that
women who were subjected to sexual violence in the conflict were further vic-
timised by the aggressive politics of their governments and their media
machines.10
In response to the processes of “othering” members of different ethnic
groups, anti-war women’s groups put emphasis on establishing multi-ethnic self-
help groups for exiled women. This was regarded as critical for their overall
wellbeing as it was considered that coming to terms with individual traumatic
experiences is importantly linked to the process of group reconciliation. By
implementing this approach they combined provision of humanitarian assistance
with psycho-social and political work with victimised women. Women activists
not only aimed to provide support by collecting and delivering aid, such as food
or clothing, or by helping these women to find work and by offering them legal
advice. Rather, the work of anti-war women’s groups put strong emphasis on the
importance of re-establishing destroyed connections across the ethnic divide,
which they considered a critically important source of individual and group
identity formation. This work demonstrated that women of different ethnic back-
grounds, with diverse experiences of victimisation, could establish and maintain
relationships of mutual respect. This was considered a starting point in
(re)developing relationships of trust, which is a critical first step in overcoming
divisions and fragmentation caused by exclusionary and nationalist politics of
war (Boric 1994; Cockburn 1998; Korac 1998c).
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In helping victimised women to come to terms with their traumatic experi-
ences, some women’s groups introduced discussion groups and writing work-
shops. This was regarded as yet another way of initiating a gradual and often
painful process of (re)establishing respect and trust in the “other” side of the
ethnic divide. In these workshops refugee and non-refugee women talked about
family, friendship, and other social ties in their communities. After years of the
divisive identity-politics of war and experiences of victimisation because of their
ethnicity, these discussions provided a supportive context permitting women to
remember the inter-ethnic links they had before the war, as well as those forged
during the conflict, their flight and its aftermath. In doing so they actively
explored the issues of loss, anger, hatred, and guilt. An activist of the Women in
Black Belgrade explained, “the women have every right to their bitterness
towards people from other ethnic origin,” and that is why the exploration of their
feelings was so important (personal communication, summer 1995). However,
the discussion groups and written accounts were typically characterised by
emerging stories and memories of life as it was before the war, and would grad-
ually lead to the recognition of good and trusted neighbours, friends, and rela-
tives whom the war turned into enemies, some real and some imagined. This
practice was invaluable because it enabled the women to create a social space in
which they were allowed to remember good and trusted people at the other side
of the ethnic divide. Within the context of identity politics of war that promoted
hatred and fear of an “other,” defined as a member of the opposed ethnic group,
this was regarded as a highly subversive activity. More importantly, because
these women had traumatic experiences during the conflict because of their
ethnicity, this process was a highly valuable step towards the reconciliation and
healing. This process proved to be critical for many of the victimised women in
dealing with their feelings of hatred and bitterness. It led to questioning issues of
identity and belonging, as they were shaped by the divisive politics of conflict as
well as their war experiences.
Through this type of “identity work” both refugee and non-refugee women
started developing positive and constructive approaches to crises, and created
spaces for mutual understanding and ongoing productive exchange. One of the
women active in Autonomous Women’s Centre Belgrade explained how each
and every one of the women involved in this process aimed at building trust in
the “other” side through their willingness to hear what the other side had to say,
and through their trust that the other side is equally willing to hear them (per-
sonal communication, summer 1995). This type of communication and
exchange created spaces in which women were positioned in a compatible way,
and where the nationalist discourse of “right” and “wrong” ethnic belonging did
not exist. Women’s experience of exile and their involvement in work organised
by anti-war women’s groups in the region exposed the hollowness of essentialist
beliefs in the “common destiny” of ethnic collectives and related narratives.
This process of women organising against war and the effort of keeping lines
of communication open was not problem-free. It caused at times internal ten-
sions and divisions.11 The spread of war, distraction, and various forms of
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victimisation of different ethnic groups in the region were new experiences for
these women. During the early years of the conflict, they found them almost
impossible to share. Their first meetings with women from “the other side”
marked the beginning of a painful, yet an overall successful process of reconcili-
ation of differences embedded in “relational positionality” of these women (Sta-
siulis 1998). Relational positionality is a concept which refers to: “the multiple
relations of power which intersect in complex ways with position of individuals
and collectives in shifting and often contradictory locations within geopolitical
spaces, historical narratives and movement politics” (Stasiulis 1998: 16–17).
Although the tensions and divisions resulting from women’s differentiated posi-
tioning and experiences of war and violence have become more widely/
internationally known, their courageous and persistent initiatives to keep com-
munications across the ethnic divide open were left largely unacknowledged.
However, connections across the ethnic divide did not only survive, but also
grew with the escalation of war violence and the growing numbers of refugees
in the region.
The email link Za mir [for peace], which was almost the only means of com-
munication within the war-torn region during the years of armed conflict, was
one of the important ways of exchange among these women. It enabled women
activists to share experiences and newly acquired knowledge concerning their
work with refugee women and survivors of sexual violence in war. It also facilit-
ated the establishment of new contacts and friendships, as well as the nurturing
of established ones. Moreover, Women in Black Belgrade were involved in
establishing a wider network of anti-war women’s groups, consisting of women
from the region as well as internationally. This has resulted in an annual meeting
of women’s solidarity against war, nationalism, and violence. Between 1992 and
the early 2000, this international meeting was held every summer in Serbia, each
meeting followed by a published report entitled Women for Peace. During the
years of the armed conflict (1991–5), participation at these meetings was highly
risky for many women coming from territories directly affected by armed con-
flict. It involved not only a laborious process of obtaining travel documents, but
also long, exhausting, and often dangerous journeys. Moreover, these women
were regarded as “disloyal” and subversive to the political interests of their
“countrymen” and the state, because of their participation at these meetings.
Thus, they were often in danger of being socially and politically stigmatised in
their places of origin and of losing their jobs (personal communication with
participants of the 6th Annual Meeting of Women’s Solidarity Against War,
Nationalism and Violence, held in Novi Sad, Serbia, August 1997).
Women-as-women cross-ethnic organising and reconciliatory
potential: concluding remarks
It is not surprising that (some) women in the region had been actively involved
in the grassroots work of keeping lines of communication open since the very
beginning of tensions and turmoil leading to war. Cockburn (1998: 44), in her
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analysis of women’s “bridge-building” projects in Northern Ireland, Israel/
Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina, points out that feminism understood as anti-
essentialist and democratic, that is – inclusive of women differently situated in
ethnic, class and other structures, tend to “immunise” women against regressive
constructions of ethnic and national identity characterising conflict constructed
as ethnic, religious, or communal strife. “If you pick a non-primordial gender
card,” she claims, “you are less likely to reach for a primordial national card”
(ibid.). Cockburn further argues that such a gender critique reveals the seductive
notions of the words “community,” “country,” and “people” invoked in national-
ist discourse, which hide within it gender and class inequalities. She goes on to
explain how anti-essentialist and democratic feminism helps (some) women to
reveal the contradicting nature of the seemingly innocent notion of “home” that
conceals confinement, divisions, oppression, and violence, and points out that
such women are “the more likely to be sceptical of ‘homeland’. If you see home
as a ‘golden cage’ you may suspect that homeland too has its contradictions”
(Cockburn 1998: 45). For these reasons, she concludes, a feminist analysis
“makes women question the pursuit of political movements by violent means”
(Cockburn 1998: 45). This and other similar feminist analyses emphasise that
women are not “natural peacemakers” and that they can indeed be deeply
involved in nationalist projects and politics. These analyses point out, however,
that because women have not been exposed to masculine socialisation, they may
be better positioned than men to question the values of a male-dominated society
and to formulate a transformative, non-violent vision of conflict resolution
(Carter 1996; Women in Black Belgrade 1994, 1997). Studies of conflicts in
Colombia and Guatemala also support this argument and demonstrate that
women’s organising tends to produce greater peace-facilitating social capital
than men’s groups (Moser and McIlwaine 2001).
Women’s organising against divisive politics and war violence in Serbia and
other parts of socialist Yugoslavia had started quite early on, before the armed
violence began. Feminism has a long history in the region, and feminists were
the first to initiate an organised women’s resistance to nationalism, violence, and
war.12 The emergence of nationalism and nationalist discourse left women
increasingly “displaced” from participation in the labour force; it “planted” them
back into the family and household. These developments were coupled with a
decrease in woman’s political participation.13 As women were losing out in eco-
nomic, social, and public life, and when their reproductive rights and freedoms
came under attack by nationalists who saw women as biological reproducers of
their nations, previously loosely linked women who called themselves feminists
began to organise. Although these groups were small and coming from the polit-
ical margin, they were among the first to publicly voice their opposition to
nationalist politics, their tactics of spreading fear and hatred and to the process
of militarisation in the region.
One of the groups these women formed in Belgrade was “Women in Black
Against War,” as mentioned earlier. These women were publicly protesting against
the Serbian regime, nationalist politics, and war, and were pressing for creative
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diplomacy and arguing for a voice for democratic women’s groups and other non-
governmental organisations in negotiating a cessation of hostilities in the country.
The first vigil of Women in Black (WiB) Belgrade was held on 9 October 1991,
and it remained the only permanent anti-war public protest to this day. This was not
the only anti-war and peace initiative started by women. In fact, women launched
almost all the early peace initiatives in Belgrade and Serbia (Mladjenovic 2003).
Mladjenovic (ibid.: 41) argues that the reasons for women making up the majority
in the early peace initiatives were threefold. Their gender position made it safer for
them to act against the regime, as men were under threat of forced mobilisation.
Also, their experience of doing unpaid work in the household made them more
open to engagement in unpaid, volunteer work in the peace movement. Finally,
their knowledge of “making do with less” facilitated their engagement in horizon-
tal, non-competitive activities. Further, and in reference to research on gender,
social capital and political participation, in any society women are more likely to be
active in the more informal reaches of politics, such as peace movements, rather
than in a more formal political arena (Lowndes 2006).
Through this kind of communication and activism these women became
engaged in bridging initiatives and practices aimed at establishing bonds across
difference and (ethnic) boundaries. The practice does not imply, however, aban-
donment of one’s own “roots” or sense of identity and belonging. In this sense,
bridging and bonding are not “either-or” categories (Putnam 2000: 23). Rather
they involve the simultaneous processes of “rooting” in one’s own membership
and identity, and “shifting” in order to put oneself in the situation of other
participants in the process or communication. This type of practice often
pursued by women’s groups has been termed transversal politics by Italian
feminists.14 This type of resistance to war that emerged initially among rather
small and marginal groups of middle-class women who considered themselves
feminists had been gradually, yet crucially, shaped and empowered by the
experiences of refugee women who have been victimised by war in various
ways. Their joint and successful efforts in organising multi-ethnic self-help
groups remained a unique attempt in developing elements of a culture of
reconciliation in the region. Although important, these groups and their work
remained marginal within the “mainstream,” male-dominated alternative polit-
ical initiatives in the region as well as internationally.
The discussion in this chapter has aimed to contribute to gendered analyses of
conflict and social capital by examining how the process of mobilisation of
social capital for war or peace is gendered and context-specific. My analysis has
also supported substantial empirical evidence that women-as-women organising
in specific contexts promotes civic bridging links and supports a type of altern-
ative politics that is embedded in cross-ethnic and cross-boundary trust and
reciprocity. This type of links and communication are central to the reconcili-
ation processes, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. Further
research and analysis is required to uncover other links and factors affecting
these (gendered) processes in order to identify and support the ones which repre-
sent a resource for democracy and peace.
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Notes
1 At the time of the 1981 census, the number of people in ethnically mixed marriages
and from ethnically mixed backgrounds was greater than the number of ethnic Alba-
nians living in Kosova, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bosniaks, and Slovenes (Petro-
vic 1985).
2 Denitch (1972) explains how the Yugoslav system of decentralisation was based on
the identification of leadership, not with ethnic, but with geopolitical (republic) inter-
ests. Given that none of the republics was ethnically homogeneous, the local leader-
ship was formed within the republics. Such formed leadership, in time, became the
leadership on the federal level, but its power base remained in the republics. Denitch
rightly argued, back in the 1970s, that this system had “a build-in tendency to develop
localism and to encourage nationalistic demagoguery” (1972: 34).
3 Empirical data used in this chapter were collected between 1994 and 1997 as part of
my PhD research project entitled The Power of Gender in the Transition from State
Socialism to Ethnic Nationalism, Militarization, and War: The Case of Post Yugoslav
States, York University, Toronto (Korac 1998a).
4 During the Second World War and the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia (1941–5)
the massacres of civilians took place throughout the region. Some of the worst were
committed by the Ustashe, pro-Nazi Croats, against the Serbian population in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ustashe also murdered left-wing Croats and the Jews
and Gypsies who came under the jurisdiction of the independent Nazi-state of
Croatia. One of the most notorious death camps in this state was run by the fascist
Ustashe at Jasenovac, where hundreds of thousands of Serbs were slaughtered
between 1941 and 1945 (Denitch 1994: 30). As Parin (1994: 39) pointed out,
independent Croatia of the 1990s was compared by many Serbs living there to the
fascist, puppet Croatian state created during the Second World War. He also emphas-
ised that the then Croatian government did not do anything to distance themselves
clearly from the crimes of fascism (ibid.).
5 For more information on the role of the media in the conflict in Rwanda see Malvern
(2002) and Des Forges (2002).
6 For more information on the role of the media in the Yugoslav conflict, see Zˇarkov
(2007).
7 Gender dimensions of identity politics of new wars in general, and in Yugoslavia in
particular, are more complex and go beyond the notion of women as “Mothers of the
Nation.” For an in-depth analysis of how identity politics of conflict in Yugoslavia
had shaped notions of femininity and masculinity, and the roles of women and men
see Zˇarkov (2007).
8 This has been well-documented in testimonies of raped women in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Stiglmayer 1994: 136).
9 “Women in Black against War” started in Israel/Palestine in the late 1980s, and
quickly spread to Italy, and on to Belgrade, London, Toronto, and other centres. By
the late 1990s, it had become a worldwide network of anti-war and anti-nationalist
women.
10 For more on these types of victimisation see Korac (1998b).
11 For more on the issue of internal tensions and divisions see Benderly (1997) and
Korac (1998a: 35–46).
12 For more on the history of feminism before the conflict see Benderly (1997), Korac
(1998a), and Papic (1995).
13 For more on how women were losing out in economic, social and public life see Milic
(1996) and Korac (1998b).
14 Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) developed conceptually this well-known strategy of femin-
ists worldwide and emphasised the centrality of the processes of “rooting” and “shift-
ing” for this type of communication and exchange.
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